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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
DAVID L. NIELSEN and 
GARWOOD H. WALTON, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents, 
MFT LEAS ING , et al • , 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
case No. 17522 
INTRODUCTION AND DESIGNATION 
OF PARTIES 
This matter comes to this court from an appeal of 
the decision of the District Court of cache County, State of 
Utah, wherein the Honorable VeNoy F. Christofferson granted 
a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, David L. Nielsen and 
Garwood H. Walton, and against the defendant and 
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counterclaimant, MFT Leasing Company. Said judgment all~~ 
plaintiffs to rescind their contracts with MFT Leasing, 
Throughout this brief the plaintiffs will be referred ~ 
either by name or in their capacity as plaintiffs, or ~e 
respondents. Defendant and counterclaimant, MFT Leasing 
will be referred to either by name or as defendant or 
appellant. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant, MFT 
Leasing and Dr. Marvin Pursinger and Pursinger Company, Inc, 
asking that plaintiffs' leases with defendant, MFT Leasing, 
be rescinded, and further that plaintiffs be granted compen· 
satory and exemplary damages from Marvin w. Pursinger and 
Pursinger Company, Inc. as a result of fraud committed by 
said Marvin w. Pursinger and Pursinger Company, Inc. in 
inducing plaintiffs to enter into their lease agreements 
with MFT Leasing Company. Defendant, MFT Leasing, coun-
terclaimed asking the court to find the plaintiffs liable~ 
defendant under their lease agreements and requesting the 
court to award MFT Leasing a money judgment based upon the 
accelerated amount due under the leases as a result of 
plaintiffs' breach. 
-2-
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was heard before the Honorable VeNoy 
Christofferson without a jury in October, 1980. Judge 
Christofferson held during the trial that there was no fraud 
as allegded in plaintiffs' complaint committed by defendant, 
MFT Leasing Company, that the leases between the parties 
were initially entered into with all the prerequisites to be 
binding agreements, and that the equipment had in fact been 
delivered to plaintiffs. 
After the trial was completed, post-trial memoranda 
were submitted and oral argument took place. Subsequently, 
the court entered a Memorandum Decision. Judge 
Christofferson ruled that plaintiffs were entitled to a 
rescission of their lease agreements with defendant, MFT 
Leasing Company, due to the fact that defendant, MFT Leasing 
Company, knew, or should have known, that the supplier of 
the equipment, namely, Pursinger Company, was not in an eco-
nomincally sound position and that certain serial numbers 
on the equipment were not the same as the ones on the lease 
agreements, and therefore, the defendant, MFT Leasing 
Company, could not deliver clear title to the equipment. 
Plaintiffs' counsel then submitted proposed Findings of 
-3-
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Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Before defendant's 
counsel had an opportunity to object as to the form of ~e 
documents, Judge Christofferson, without notice, entered 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their complaint ~d , 
against the defendants. 
A subsequent Memorandum Decision was entered by lli 
court amending certain of the original Findings of Fact a~ 
reducing the costs awarded to plaintiffs. An amendment to 
1 
the original Findings of Fact, together with an amended 
Judgment was then prepared and submitted to the court, whk, 
I 
amended Judgment was signed by the court on January 26, I 
1981. This appeal is prosecuted from the Judgment of ~e I 
court allowing the plaintiffs to rescind their contracts wi'.· 
defendant, MFT Leasing Company. Defendants, Marvin w. I 
Pursinger and Pursinger Company, Inc. never answered 
plaintiffs' complaint against them, and therefore, a DefG~ 
Judgment was entered against said defendants in January, 
1981. Said defendants are not a part of this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the decision of the lower 
court allowing the plaintiffs to rescind their contracts wi'.' 
MFT Leasing reversed, to have an order entered granting 
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defendant and counterclaimant, MFT Leasing, judgment against 
the plaintiffs as prayed for in their complaint, or in the 
alternative, remanding this action for a new trial before 
the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 30, 1978, plaintiff/respondent, 
Garwood H. Walton entered into several agreements with 
Pursinger Company, Inc. (Tr. page 21 and defendant's Ex. 3 
and Ex. 4). Prior to the signing of the agreements, Mr. 
Walton had worked for Pursinger Company on a consulting 
basis for several months and had visited the Pursinger 
Company offices in Los Angeles, California where a leasing 
program had been explained by Dr. Pursinger to Mr. Walton 
(Tr. page 21). The program called for Pursinger Company to 
deliver the equipment to plaintiffs and have plaintiffs 
arrange a financing lease with a leasing company, and sub-
sequently lease the same equipment back to Pursinger 
Company. On or about December 4, 1978, David L. Nielsen 
entered into several agreements with Pursinger Company which 
appeared at trial as defendant's Exhibits 5 through 10. Dr. 
Pursinger explained to both Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Walton that 
they would be leasing Dr. Pursinger's computers through a 
-5-
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separate leasing company and that Dr. Pursinger and his coi.li 
' 
pany would sign a guarantee with Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen: 
wherein Dr. Pursinger would reimburse them for the lease 
payments that they were required to make to the leasing 
company. (Tr. pages 21 and 60). In exchange for Mr. 
Walton and Mr. Nielsen using their credit rating to procure 
leases of Dr. Pursinger' s equipment, they were to receive 
! 
I 
the investment tax credit, together with interest free ~~! 
during the period of the leases in the amounts of $30,000 i 
for Mr. Nielsen and some smaller amount for Mr. Walton, 
(Tr. pages 21 and 82). At the time that Dr. Pursinger 
entered into his agreements with Mr. Wal ton he verbally I 
agreed to pay Mr. Walton a 3% to 5% commission on any leases 
which were entered into as a result of Mr. Walton intro-
ducing Dr. Pursinger to other prospective Lessees. (Tr. 
page 36). Based upon the agreements which Mr. Nielsen and 
Mr. Walton had with Dr. Pursinger, it did not make any dif· 
ference to them how the computers were used, how they were 
set up, or the amount of use of the computers as Dr. 
Pursinger was to receive all the monies from the rental of 
the computers. (Tr. pages 48, 49, 81, and 82). 
Pursuant to the agreements between Pursinger 
-6-
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company and Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Walton, the computer units 
were delivered to plaintiffs sometime between Christmas and 
New Year's of 1978 at the offices of David Nielsen. During 
the latter part of December, 1978, MFT Leasing Company 
received from Dividend Financial Company (another Leasing 
company not a party to this action) the information, 
including financial background, on several proposed leases 
wherein Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen, among others, would be 
Lessees of certain equipment supplied by Pursinger Company. 
(Tr. 107). Mr. Robert Barr, an employee of MFT Leasing 
Company, contacted Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Walton in late 
~cember, 1978, to see if they were indeed interested in 
entering into a lease with MFT Leasing Company. After 
reviewing the financial statements submitted by Mr. Nielsen 
and Mr. Walton, and making several preliminary credit 
checks, Mr. Barr arranged to meet with Mr. Nielsen and Mr. 
Walton in Logan, Utah on the 15th of January, 1979, for the 
purpose of executing the lease agreements. (Tr. pages 204 
and 205). On or about January 15, 1979, Mr. Barr met with 
Mr. Walton in his office and with Mr. Nielsen at the office 
of George Daines, Esq. in Logan, Utah, at which time both 
Mr· Wal ton and Mr. Nielsen signed the lease agreements which 
are defendant's Exhibits l and 2. As part of their exe-
-7-
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cuting the lease agreement, both Mr. Wal ton and Mr. Niels, 
executed a separate page of the lease agreement entitled, 
"Acknowledgment of Delivery" wherein they stated that the 
equipment listed on Exhibit "A" to the lease agreement had 
been delivered to them, was in good condition and repair, 
that they accepted the equipment as satisfactory, and 
further, that they had examined the invoice for the equip-
ment and specifically requested MFT Leasing to pay the 
amount of said invoice to the supplier (Pursinger Company),, 
(Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2). After the leases were exe- I 
I 
cuted by Mr. Wal ton and Mr. Nielsen, Mr. Barr returned to I 
I Salt Lake and after the credit checks had been completed on ! 
Mr. Wal ton and Mr. Nielsen and both were found to be credit I 
I 
worthy, and the leases had been approved by MFT Leasing 
Company, MFT Leasing paid Pursinger Company for the computer I 
units. Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen had already paid to 
Pursinger Company the first and last months' payment, and 
thus, when the funds were disbursed a credit was given to 
Mr. Walton's and Mr. Nielsen's account in the appropriate 
' 
amounts. (Defendant's Exhibits 23, 24, and I Tr. pages 21 I 
and 22). After the leases were 
I 
executed, Mr, Wal ton and Mr. 1 
Nielsen failed and refused to make any payments under ~~ 
leases. On or about April 11, 1979, Mr. Nielsen attempted 
-8-
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to rescind his lease through a letter sent by his attorney 
to MFT Leasing Company. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 37). On or 
about April 16, 1979, written demand was sent to both Mr. 
walton and Mr. Nielsen informing them that they were in 
default in their lease payments and demanding that they 
bring their leases current, or MFT would accelerate the 
entire remaining unpaid balance pursuant to the lease 
agreements. (Defendant's Exhibits 35 and 36). Subsequent to 
MFT Leasing's demand letters being sent to Mr. Walton and 
Mr. Nielsen, a Complaint asking for rescission of the 
contracts was filed by them on April 19, 1979. On or about 
May 3, 1979, MFT Leasing filed its Answer and Counterclaim 
asking the court to award MFT Leasing Company compensatory 
damages for the breach of the lease agreements. 
During the trial, plaintiffs were allowed to take 
the stand and testify concerning their extraneous agreements 
with Dr. Pursinger which agreements were never mentioned in 
the written documents between the plaintiffs and MFT Leasing 
Company. 
over the objection of counsel for the defendant, 
MFT Leasing Company, that the testimony and exhibits were 
parole evidence and not properly introduced, the court 
-9-
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allowed plaintiffs to testify and to introduce numerous 
exhibits pertaining to their agreements with Marvin 
Pursinger and Pursinger, Co., Inc. 
As additional facts may become necessary to the 
argument in this brief, they will be presented in the 
argument. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
PLAINTIFFS TO PRESENT PAROLE EVIDENCE TO 
CONTRADICT THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL 
LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACTS BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFFS AND MFT LEASING COMPANY. 
The uncontroverted facts in this case show that Mr. 
Walton and Mr. Nielsen did indeed sign and execute lease 
agreements with MFT Leasing Company obligating them to the 
terms as set forth in said lease agreements. It is also 
undisputed that MFT Leasing Company, relying upon the repre· 
sentations of Mr. Walton and Mr. Neilsen, paid Pursinger 
Company good and valable consideration for the computers 
which were the subject matter of MFT Leasing's leases with 
Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen. The law in the State of Utah 
concerning contracts is that unless there is some ambiguity 
-10-
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in the contract, the terms of the contract must speak for 
themselves, and unless the subject matter of the contract is 
illegal or otherwise unenforceable, the courts cannot 
rewrite the contract, but must enforce the contract pursuant 
to its terms. Lamb ~ Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, Strout Western 
Realty Agency, Inc. ~ Broderick, 522 P.2d 144. In the 
~ v. Broderick case, supra, Justice Ellett commented on 
the underlying reasons for the court's refusal to allow 
extraneous evidence in to contradict a written agreement and 
quoted the Minnesota Supreme Court wherein it stated: 
Without that rule there would be no assurance of 
the enforceability of a written contract. If such 
assurance were removed today from our law, general 
disaster would result, because of the consequent 
destruction of confidence, for the tremendous but 
closely adjusted machinery of modern business can-
not function at all without confidence in the 
enforceability of contracts. 
Justice Ellett specifically states at page 145 the 
following: 
However, under the general rule which is 
applicable here, parole evidence may not be given 
to change the terms of a written agreement which 
are clear, definite and unambiguous. To permit 
that would be to cast doubt upon the integrity of 
all contracts and to leave a party to a solemn 
agreement at the mercy of the uncertainties of oral 
testimony given by one who in the subsequent light 
of events discovers that he made a bad bargain. 
-11-
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r 
Justice Ellett' s comments in the Strout case are 
equally applicable to the case at bar. The trial court 
erred in allowing plaintiff to, in effect, modify the terms 
of an unambiguous contract through the use of parole evi-
dence in the form of oral testimony given solely by the 
plaintiffs. It was not until the plaintiffs realized Dr. 
Pursinger was not going to live up to his extraneous 
agreements with them that they decided not to honor their 
contract with MFT Leasing. During cross-examination by 
defendant's counsel, the following admission was made by Mr., 
Nielsen: 
Q, Mr. Nielsen, is it fair say that you decided 
not to pay MFT Leasing Company on your lease 
when you discovered that Dr. Pursinger was not 
going to pay you? 
A. I would guess that would be fair to say that. 
(Tr 85), 
There is simply no ambiguity in the contracts bet-
ween plaintiffs and defendant, MFT Leasing company, which 
justifies the allowance by the trial court of parole ev~n~ 
to modify the terms of the leases. 
-12-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY APPROP-
RIATE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES IN ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFFS TO RESCIND THEIR LEASES WITH 
MFT LEASING 
Plaintiffs suit for rescission is a suit in equity. 
Mortensen ~ Berzell, 429 P.2d 945, 102 Arizona, 348 (Arz. 
1967}, to which the trial court was required to apply 
equitable principles. 
The trial court either misapplied or failed to 
apply the equitable principles set forth below in deciding 
that plaintiffs were entitled to rescind their contracts. 
A. Equity will not aid ~ ~ who has himself 
been guilty of the first breach of the contract. (17 Am.Jur 
2d on Contracts at §365. 
This doctrine is referred to in the California case 
of Joshua Tree Towncite Co. ~ Joshua Tree Land Company, 
224 P. 2d 85, wherein the court stated at page 90: 
A party to a contract who has defaulted cannot seek 
rescission. Fairchild - Gilmore - Wilton Co. vs. 
southern Refining company, 158 caI. 264, lIO""P-:-9'1; 
North America Drudging Company vs. Outer Harbor 
Dock and Warf Company, 178 Cal. 406, 173 P. 756. 
The uncontraverted evidence at trial established 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the fact that the leases were executed by Mr. Wal ton and Mr. 
Nielsen on or about January 15, 1979. The first payments 
were due on those leases on or about March 10, 1979. Both 
Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen admitted under oath that they 
never did make any payment on their leases with MFT Leasing 
Company. Mr. Nielsen attempted to rescind his lease on or 
about April 11, 1979 and Mr. Wal ton attempted to rescind his 
lease on or about April 19, 1979. Both attempts at 
rescission were more than one month after Mr. Walton and Mr. 
Nielsen were in default in their payment on their leases. 
The lease itself, (Paragraph 21) does not requin 
any notice of failure to pay the amounts due thereunder 
prior to the Lessor exercising its remedies granted in 
Paragraph 21. Nevertheless, MFT did in fact send written 
notice to both Wal ton and Nielsen demanding that the leases 
be brought current or payments would be accelerated. 
(Exhibits 1, 2, 35, and 36). 
B. Plaintiffs do not have "clean hands". 
Plaintiffs must have clean hands in order to ask a court ~ 
use its equitable powers in rescinding their lease 
agreements. This they simply cannot due. The facts aA 
uncontroverted that Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen had the com· 
-14-
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puters in their possession for a period of approximately one 
month prior to their entering into their lease agreements 
with MFT Leasing Company. Both Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen 
had dealt extensively with Pursinger Company. Mr. Walton 
was working for Pursinger Company at the time of the execu-
tion of his lease with MFT. Mr. Walton was to receive a 
commission from Pursinger Company of from 3% to 5% of the 
monies received by Pursinger Company from MFT in funding the 
leases. Both Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen were to receive 
interest free loans or pledges of substantial amounts of 
money if and when the leases were funded. As a result of 
the promises made to Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen by Dr. 
Pursinger, they decided to sign and execute the lease 
agreements with MFT Leasing Company, since to have the leases 
executed meant immediate economic benefit to them, sup-
posedly without the attendent risk normally involved in a 
business transaction. 
In Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, (Utah 
1976), plaintiff sought to have certain deeds construed as 
equitable mortgages. The Supreme Court in refusing to exer-
cise its equitable powers made the following statement at 
page 158: 
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It is inherent in the nature and purpose of equit· 
that it will grant relief only where fairness and 1 
good conscience so demand. Correlated to this b 
the precept that equity does not reward one who ha, 
engaged in fraud or deceit in the business under 
consideration, but reserves its reward for tho~ 
who are themselves acting in fairness and good 
conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those who 
come into court with clean hands. 
As in the Jacobson case, Supra, it was the plain· 
tiffs who chose to deal secretly with Dr. Pursinger and 
Pursinger Company and enter into extraneous agreements 
calling for Dr. Pursinger to guarantee plaintiffs' leases, 
all of which were not disclosed by the plaintiffs to 
defendant, MFT Leasing. 
C. Equity will not assist ~ in extricating him· 
self from circumstances which he created. 
In Battistone vs. American Land Development, 607 
P.2d 837, (Utah 1980), Justice Hall stated: 
A court in equity will generally not assist one in 
extricating himself from circumstances which he has 
created. Plaintiff is solely responsible for 
putting Hales in a position to convey the property, 
she having conveyed the property to Hales by 
Warranty Deed, and Hales having properly recorded 
it. 
This basic principal was also followed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Pacific Metals company vs. 
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bn 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust, 21 U.2d 400, 446 P.2d 303, 
wherein it stated: 
We are not very much impressed with the equity of 
Tracy's position thus essayed: That even though 
it committed a wrong in cashing the check, it was 
the responsiblity of the drawee bank of Salt Lake 
to promptly refuse to pay the check and warn Tracy 
so it could save itself from loss. It is the 
general principal that one who commits a wrong must 
take the consequences and cannot complain that 
someone else does not rescue him therefrom. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs, after dealing with 
Pursinger Company directly, and after having possession of 
the computer units for approximately one month, executed a 
written Acknowledgment of Delivery requesting defendants to 
pay Pursinger Company for the computers. 
Any failure of plaintiffs to receive the computers 
was the result of their own careless acts. Had they not 
signed the Acknowledgment, MFT Leasing would not have 
paid Pursinger and the loss would have been avoided. 
At best, plaintiffs' actions fall in the category 
outlined by this court in the case of ~ Eugene England 
Foundation vs. Smith's Food King!..§_, 542 P.2d 753 at page 
755, wherein it stated: 
There is another doctrine in the administration of 
justice which bears upon the situation here and 
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harmonizes with the decision of the trial court: 
where one or two innocent parties must suffer a 
loss because of the misconduct of the third (First 
Federal Corporation), the law generally leans 
towards placing the loss upon the one who made the 
choice and created the circumstances out of which 
the loss came about. It was England who chose to 
get involved with First Federal Corporation and thi 
troubles that emanated therefrom. 
In the case at bar, it was Mr. Walton and Mr. 
Nielsen who chose to get involved with Pursinger Company, 
It was they who chose to enter into guarantee agreements 
wherein Dr. Pursinger guaranteed the payment of the leases, 
It was Mr. Walton and Mr. Nielsen who used their credit to 
obtain funds for Pursinger's benefit as well as their own. 
It was they who anticipated receiving a hidden benefit fioo 
the transaction in the form of either a commission or 
interest free loans, or both. And finally, it was they who 
were to receive the investment tax credit under the leases. 
As stated in the Eugene England Foundation, case Supra, MFT 
Leasing should not be punished because Mr. Wal ton and Mr. 
Nielsen now find that they cannot collect on their judgment 
which they are entitled to as against Dr. Pursinger for his 
misrepresentations and failure to reimburse Mr. Walton a~ 
Mr. Nielsen for the lease payments which they were required 
to make to MFT. MFT was simply not a party to the extra-
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neous agreements entered into between Dr. Pursinger and Mr. 
walton and Mr. Nielsen, and should not be punished as a 
result of those agreements. (See also Heaston vs. Martinez, 
282 P.2d 833. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT, MFT LEASING DID NOT HAVE GOOD 
AND MARKETABLE TITLE TO THE COMPUTER 
UNITS 
It is undisputed by Plaintiffs that Pursinger 
company purchased from Datapoint Corporation the computers 
and subsequently had them delivered to Logan, Utah for the 
benefit of the defendant. Mr. Walton testified that he knew 
the Pursinger computers were manufactured by Datapoint and 
in fact, had talked to Datapoint personnel prior to the exe-
cution of his lease with MFT. (Tr. page 296). 
Is there a defect in title from Datapoint to 
Pursinger Company? The law clearly says, "no". Plaintiff 
directs the court to §70A-2-401(1) and (2), Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended. This section reads as follows: 
(1) ..• Any retention or reservation by the seller 
of the title (property) in goods shipped or deli-
vered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reser-
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vation of a security interest. Subject to these 
prov is ions and to the prov is ions of the chapter 01 
Secured Transactions (chapter 9), title to goods 
passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner 
and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by tne 
parties. 
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title 
passes to the buyer at the time and place at whicl. 
the seller completes his performance with referu~ 
to the physical delivery of the goods, despite an1 
reservation of a security interest and even ~~~ 
a document of title is to be delivered at a dif-
ferent time or place; and in particular and despit' 
any reservation of a security interest by the bill 
of lading. 
The trial court took judicial notice of the 
pleadings in a Civil No. 17817. Said pleadings included th 
sales agreement between Datapoint Corporation and Pursinger 
Company whereby Datapoint sold to Pursinger the computers 
which were ultimately delivered to the defendants. This 
sales agreement was marked and entered as Exhibit 22 at 
trial. Plaintiff calls the court's attention to paragraph' 
of the sales agreement which reads: 
Seller [Datapoint] warrants that Buyer [Pursingerl 
shall acquire the equipment purchased hereunder, 
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances u~~ 
for Seller's purchase money security interest. 
( [ ] supplied) • 
This reservation is in accordance with the appl~ 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cable law; to-wit: §70A-2-401(1), Utah Code Annotated, 
which reads: 
. • .Any retention or reservation by the seller of 
the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered 
to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation 
of a security interest. 
Thus, upon the delivery of the units to Pursinger 
company, title passed to Pursinger Company subject to 
oatapoint's security interest. 
Pursinger then delivered the goods to defendants, 
Nielsen and Walton, who accepted delivery, acknowledged that 
they were satisfied and requested that plaintiff make 
payment, which it did in the total sum of $92,461.73. 
Did the purchase of the equipment by MFT eliminate 
Datapoint's security interest in the goods? "Yes". The 
interrelationship of §§70A-2, et seq. and 70A-9, ~seq., is 
determinative on this issue. §70A-9-307(1) clearly handles 
the problem of retained security interests as are present 
under the present fact pattern. It states: 
PROTECTION OF BUYERS OF GOODS. -(1) A Buyer, 
[MFT] in ordinary course of business (subsection 
(9) of §70A-l-201) other than a person buying farm 
products from a person engaged in farming 
operations, takes free of a security interest 
created by his seller even though the security 
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interest is erfected and even thou h the bu er 
knows of its existence. ( ] and emphasis 
supplied). 
Thus it is clear that when MFT purchased the com-
puters from Pursinger, MFT acquired good, clear and unencu1. 
bered title to the goods. 
Plaintiffs argued that since the numbers used to 
identify the units delivered do not match with the numbers 
used to identify them on the lease, that they should not be 
held to the terms of the lease. The issue of the serial 
numbers is a feeble attempt to now extricate the plaintlih 
from their acknowledgment of delivery. It was this 
acknowledgment that defendant and counteclaimant, MFT 
Leasing, relied upon when disbursing the funds to Pursinger 
Company. The court's allowance of such an argument not onl1 
resulted in an unjust result in th is case, but also placed 
in jeopardy every commercial transaction where a lessor 
relies upon an lessee's right to inspection, and based upon 
the lessee's own representations, disburses funds to the 
supplier and/or manufacturer. 
Although the transaction between MFT Leasing 
Company and defendants, Nielsen and Wal ton, is not a sale, 
the Commercial Code helps shed light on the proper outcome 
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of defendants, Nielsen and Walton's contention regarding the 
serial number discrepancies. 
Section 70A-2-601 gives the buyer the right to 
inspect the goods. It states: 
BUYER'S RIGHTS ON IMPROPER DELIVERY - Subject to 
the provisions of this chapter on breach in 
installment contracts (S70A-2-612) and unless 
otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual 
limitations of remedy (SS70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719), 
if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any 
respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may: 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any cornmerical units or units 
and reject the rest. 
Defendants, Nielsen and Walton, testified that the 
goods were delivered aproximately one month before the lease 
agreement was signed (Walton, Tr. 40). It was not until 
some time after April 11, 1979, nearly four months later, 
and after MFT Leasing had relied upon their acceptance that 
they took any action to attempt to reject the goods. This 
area of timely rejection in regards to sales is treated in 
Anderson Second Edition where the author states: 
If the buyer does not reject the goods within a 
reasonable time he is deemed to have accepted them. 
City Miron ~Yonkers Raceway, .!!!.£:_, 5 UCCR 576, 
affd. (CA2) 400 F.2d 112. 
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The author further states: 
A reasonable period for inspection overlaps a 
reasonable opportunity to inspect. Thus, if 
inspection disclosed a defect, there remains the 
obligation to reject within a reasonable time, h 
in any case where the buyer passes up a reasonable 
oeportuni ty to inspect' he thus fails to reject-
Wl thin a reasonable time. (City Miron ~ Yonkers 
Raceway, supra.) (Emphasis supplied). 
Under the present situation the plaintiffs, Nielse: 
and Walton, had the equipment in their possession for 
nearly one month prior to executing the lease, obviously 
enough time to inspect the equipment for defects, etc, Thee 
had even prior to delivery of the equipment made arrange-
ments (unbeknownst to MFT Leasing) to sublease the same 
equipment back to Pursinger Company so as to hopefully eli· 
minate their exposure under the lease. To say now that the 
serial numbers were incorrect is an attempt to reject 
delivery. Due to their delays, etc., they have lost any 
right they might have had to reject the goods. 
The question of serial numbers is in essence a sub 
part of plaintiffs' contention that MFT Leasing never had 
title to the computer units and/or did not deliver the 
equipment described on the lease. This was contrary to ~e 
court's own finding made during the trial wherein it stated: 
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THE COURT: 
MR. HOWELL: 
THE COURT: 
Fraud is out. 
Is delivery out too, your Honor? 
Delivery is -- it was delivered, but 
as to their responsibility of what 
they're going to have to pay for on 
this lease, there's nothing here 
that -- (Tr. 167-168). 
For the above-stated reasons, it is clear that 
under the laws of the State of Utah, defendant, MFT Leasing 
company, acquired good and marketable title when it paid 
Pursinger Company valuable consideration for the computer 
units already in the possession of plaintiffs. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF MFT LEASING KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE 
KNOWN OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF 
PURSINGER COMPANY OR ITS PRIOR AGREEMENTS 
WITH THE PLAINTIFFS, SAID KNOWLEDGE IS 
NOT GROUNDS FOR RECISSION OF THE LEASES 
Judge Christofferson, in his Memorandum 
Decision, stated as follows: 
The court also feels that under the circumstances 
since all contracts were with Pursinger and MFT 
until MFT brought the leases to the plaintiffs, 
they were aware of the arrangement (Record p. 140). 
Judge Christofferson went on to state that as a 
result of MFT's knowledge of Pursinger's financial problem, 
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and its agreement with plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were 
entitled to rescind their contract with MFT. It is respec~. 
fully submitted that there is no basis, either at law or 
equity, for the recission of plaintiffs' contracts with ~T 
Leasing based upon the findings of Judge Christofferson as 
stated above. The arrangements with Pursinger Company and 
the plaintiffs were separate agreements signed approximate!: 
one month prior to plaintiffs entering into their leases 
with MFT. (Defendant Ex. 4, 8, 9, and 10). These 
agreements were guarantee and recourse agreements between 
Marvin Pursinger, Pursinger Company, Inc. and the 
plaintiffs. The agreements specif'ically contemplated that 
the plaintiffs would obtain leasing from independent leasin: 
companies, the payment of said leases to be guaranteed to 
the plaintiffs by Dr. Pursinger and his company. The fact 
that Dr. Pursinger failed to live up to his contracts with 
plaintiffs in no way excuses plaintiffs from liability on 
their separate contracts with MFT Leasing. 
Defendant's counsel has not been able to find any 
case law to support Judge Christofferson's ruling on a 
rescission of the leases between plaintiffs and MFT Leasing 
based upon the supposed knowledge of MFT, of either 
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plaintiffs' prior agreements with Pursinger Company or the 
financial condition of Dr. Pursinger and his Company. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs entered into binding lease agreements 
with MFT Leasing Company. Relying upon plaintiff's signed 
Acknowledgment of Delivery, MFT Leasing paid in excess of 
$90,000.00 to Pursinger Company for purchase of the computer 
units leased by MFT to plaintiffs. There are no grounds for 
plaintiffs' claim for the equitable relief of rescission 
which was granted by the trial court. The law in the State 
of Utah is clear that a party may not rescind a contract 
after he is in default, or when the loss was occasioned by 
negligence or misconduct by the party asking for the 
rescission. Plaintiffs fall squarely within the aforemen-
tioned bars to the relief requested by them. Given the 
facts established at trial and applying those facts to the 
law as it relates to rescission of contracts, it is respect-
fully submitted that the trial court's Judgment should be 
reversed and defendant, MFT Leasing, be given judgment 
against David L. Nielsen in the amount of $101,712.02, and 
Garwood H. Walton in the amount of $50,872.01, together 
with reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of court as pro-
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vided for in the contract, or in the alternative that this 
matter be reversed and remanded for further proceedings in 
the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of March, 
1981. 
TIBBALS, ADAMSON, PETERS 
& HOWELL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Appellent's Brief on Appeal to be 
mailed to W. Scott Barrett, Attorey for Plaintiffs, at 300 
South Main Street, Logan, Utah 84321, this 24th day of 
March, 198 l. 
Michael z. Hayes 
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